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Unique value-maximizing programs of irreversible capacity investment and capacity utiliza-
tion are described and shown to exist under general conditions for a monopolist exhibiting capital
adjustment costs and serving random consumer demand for a nondurable good over an infinite
horizon. Stationary properties of these programs are then fully characterized under the assump-
tion of serially independent demand disturbances. Optimal monopoly behavior in this case includes
acquisition of aconstant and positivelevel ofcapacity, the maintenance of a positiveexpected value
of excess capacity in each period, and an asymmetrical response of price to unanticipated fluctua-
tions in consumer demand. Under a general form of Markovian demand, the effect of uncertainty
on irreversible capacity investment is also described in terms of the discounted flow of expected
revenue accruing to the marginal unit of existing capacity and the option value of deferring the
acquisition of additional capital. The option value of deferring such acquisition, created by the
irreversibility of capacity investment, is characterized directly in terms of the value function of the
firm, and is then shown to be zero in a stationary equilibrium with serially independent demand
disturbances. The response of investment to increased demand uncertainty depends, as a result,
directly on the properties of the marginal revenue product of capital. A non-negative response of
optimal capacity to increased uncertainty in market demand is demonstrated for ageneral class of
aggregate consumer preferences.I. Introduction
The existence of uncertainty in consumer demand can exert a crucial influence on the invest-
ment, production and pricing decisions of firms. When investment in capital is irreversible, such
uncertainty can expose firms to risk from the possibility of having insufficient productive capacity
on hand in periods of robust demand, while in periods of slack demand firms are exposed to risk
from the opportunity cost of committing to suboptimal levels of current capacity, instead of re-
maining flexibleto postpone investment to more advantageous future states. This tension between
committing to current investment or maintaining the flexibility to invest at amore propitious date
in the future can also directly affect the current pricing and production decisions of those firms
which have extensive market power, requiring managers to assess the trade-off between respond-
ing to unanticipated demand fluctuations through price adjustment or through an adjustment of
current production schedules.
When capacity constraints in the production technology and the irreversible nature of capital
investment represent bounds on the ability ofafirm to profitably exploit current and future random
fluctuations in consumer demand, the influence of uncertainty on the investment, production and
pricing decisions of the firm is represented in the firm’s two types of decisions about the value of
capacity: (i) investment decisions, which affect future capacity; and (ii) production and pricing
decisions, which reflect the optimal utilization of existing capacity. The purpose of this paper is
to integrate these two types of decisions into a single intertemporal model capable of generating
explicit implications ofdemand uncertainty and capacity irreversibility for the nonstrategic invest-
ment, production and pricing behavior of a representative firm. Specifically, we consider optimal
investment, production and pricing rules for a risk-neutral monopolist exhibiting capacity adjust-
ment costs and serving random consumer demand for a nondurable good over an infinite horizon.
A one period-lag in the acquisition of productive capital exposes the firm to risk from the alter-
native possibilities of inadequate capacity and insufficient demand while decisions regarding the
utilization of existing capacity are made after the resolution of current uncertainty. These features
lead to important implications for the roles of uncertainty and irreversibility in influencing the
intertemporal behavior of investment, prices and capacity utilization.
Five propositions about monopoly behavior are offered. First, unique value-maximizing rules
for capacity, investment, production and pricing are shown to exist under an extremely general
Markovian specification of demand uncertainty and several characteristics of these rules are ex-
amined. The influence of uncertainty and irreversibility on capital investment are, when grossinvestment is positive, described in terms of both the discounted flow of expected revenue accruing
to the marginal unit ofcapacity as wellas the value of deferring the acquisition of an additional unit
of capital, which will be non-negative as a result of the irreversible nature of capital investment.
The flow of expected marginal revenue, and the value of deferring acquisition of the marginal unit
ofcapital, are respectively characterized directly in terms of the valuefunction describing the firm’s
optimal dynamic program. Optimal capacity is shown to equate the discounted flow of expected
marginal revenue to the total cost of acquiring the marginal unit of capital, which consists of both
adirect cost and an opportunity cost of exercising the firm’s option to defer acquisition of this unit
to asubsequent period.
Second, four stationary properties of these rules are then characterized under the assumption
that disturbances to consumer demand display serial independence. Optimal monopoly behavior
in this situation includes the maintenance of both a constant level of capacity over time and,
in contrast to the analogous competitive industry, a positive level of expected excess capacity
in each period. Optimal monopoly behavior also includes an asymmetrical response of price to
unanticipated demand fluctuations, with any downward adjustment of price in response to a weak
state of demand being circumscribed by the market power of the firm and its optimal maintenance
of a measure of excess capacity. Finally, the option value of deferring acquisition of the marginal
unit of capital is shown to be zero in a stationary equilibrium with serially independent demand,
and the responseof optimal capacityto amean-preserving spread in the distribution of disturbances
to market demand, which in thiscasewill depend entirely on the convexity of the marginal revenue
product of capital, is shown to be non-negative for abroad class of aggregateconsumer preferences.
The role of demand uncertainty in the nonstrategic investment, pricing and capacity utiliza-
tion decisions of firms has been a topic of considerable interest in recent years and has generated
numerous analyses of each of these separate decisions. Lucas and Prescott (1971) demonstrated
the existence of optimal investment programs for risk-neutral firms in a competitive industry with
endogenous price uncertainty and gave a limited characterization of a stationary competitiveequi-
librium with serially independent demand disturbances. Hartman (1972), Nickell (1977), Pindyck
(1982), Abel ((1983), (1984)), and Albrecht and Hart (1983), among others, subsequently exam-
ined the response of capital investment by competitive firms to increased uncertainty in consumer
demand, with disparate results. Jones and Ostroy (1984) provided ageneral characterization ofthe
value of flexibility, with an application to capital investment, in a simple finite-horizon model of
sequential decision-making. Smith (1969), Zabel (1972) and Meyer (1975) examined the influence
2of demand uncertainty on the maintenance of excess capacity by monopolists operating in either a
static market or under afinite planning horizon. Appelbaum and Lim (1982) studied the differen-
tial responses of industry production to increased demand uncertainty in static monopolistic and
competitive equilibria. Reagan (1982), Schutte (1984), Amihud and Mendelson (1983) and Zabel
(1986) considered the role of optimal inventory policies of monopolistic firms in influencing the
response of prices to unanticipated serially independent demand fluctuations in stationary equilib-
ria. Nickell ((1974), (1978)) examinedthe influence of irreversibility on the investment decisions of
firms respectively operating under certainty or under uncertainty about the timing of a single shift
in demand, while Pindyck (1988) most recently characterized the marginal investment decision and
the value of deferring irreversible capacity investment in terms of financial option theory, using the
specific caseof consumer demand evolving according to geometric Brownian motion.’ Eachof these
papers uses a distinct model to study the influence of demand uncertainty on one unique aspect
of firm behavior. Our paper integrates all of these aspects into a single intertemporal model of
the firm. This allows us to describe the effects of uncertainty and irreversibility on the value of
a marginal unit of capacity under relatively general assumptions about market demand and capi-
tal adjustment costs and, in particular, to illustrate the recursive influence of current investment
decisions on the utilization of capacity, as reflected through production and pricing decisions, in
subsequent periods.
The paper is organized as follows. The model of the firm is presented in section II. The
existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium and the nature of the unique optimal investment
rule forthe monopolist under ageneral Markovian specification of consumer demand are examined
in section III. Section IV characterizes stationary properties of optimal monopoly investment,
pricing and capacity utilization rules forthe case of serialindependence. Conclusions appear in the
final section.
II. The Model
We consider a monopolist producing a quantity q(t) of a nondurable good in each period tb y
means of the single input of capital, k(t)~2 Production occurs under constant returns to scale so
that k(t) denotes the level offull capacity, q(t)/k(t) denotes the current level of capacity utilization,
and the production function may be written as:
0~q(t) ~ k(t). (1)
Costs of adjusting capacity are represented by a nonlinear relation between investment and
3capital in successive periods,
k(t + 1) = k(t)h(x(t)/k(t)), (2)
wherex(t) denotes gross investment andh(.) is bounded, continuously different able, increasing and
strictly concave.3 Investment in capital is assumed at least partially irreversiHe, so that x(t) 0
and 0 < h(0) ~ 1, and depreciation in capacity is indexed by the parameter 6, so that S = h’ (1)
exists for 0 < 6 < 1, allowing maintenance of the capacity level k(t) to occur at the rate of gross
investment Sk(t).
Market demand in each period is described by a conventional inverse demand function,
p(t) = D(q(t),u(t)), (3)
where p(t) is the current product price and u(t) is a random disturbance. Under all realizations of
u(t), the inverse demand function is assumed to be twice-continuously differentiable with D, <0,
D2
> 0, and D, < (—q(t)/2)D,,, non-negative, finite and bounded above S at a zero level of
sales. The random disturbance u(t) is assumed to be a real-valued Markov process overa compact
support [st, u}, with a continuously-differentiable transition probability function f(u(t), u(t + 1)) .~
Revenue from current sales is defined by (2) to be:
G(q(t),u(t)) = q(t)D(q(t),u(t)). (4)
The qualities of the inverse demand function in (3) imply that, for any realization of the random
disturbance u(t), the function G(.) is twice continuously-differentiable, strictly concave in q(t),
bounded uniformly for all q(t) > 0 and, conditional on the capacity constraint (1), defined over
the compact interval [0,k(t)]. Expected marginal revenue from the minimal level of optimal sales
is also assumed to exceed the marginal cost of maintaining a constant level of capacity, so that
EG1~ u(t)) > 8, where ~(u(t)) denotes, for any realization u(t), an unconstrained maximum
for revenue from current sales in (4).~ Using (4), the stochastic value of the monopolist is defined
as:
>~~t(G(q(t)u(t))— x(t)), (5)
where fi = 1/(l + r) is the constant discount rate and r > 0i sthe riskiess rate of interest.6
The timing of the monopolist’s sales and investment decisions create a dependence of revenue
on existing capacity, k(t), and the demand disturbance, u(t). At the beginning of each period, the
monopolist observes the current realization of the inverse demand schedule and selects a level of
production and sales, q(t), to maximize current revenue in (4) subject to the constraint imposed
4through (1) by the existing level of capacity. Based on a rational expectation of demand in future
periods, the monopolist must alsosimultaneously select a level of investment, x(t), which istrans-
formed into capital with a delay of one period.7 Since production and sales are chosen to maximize
the strictly concave revenue function (4) over the compact set [0,k(t)], a uniqueoptimal sales policy
exists and may be denoted by q(t) = q(k(t), u(t)) ~8This allows revenue in each period to be defined
directly in terms of k(t) and u(t) as:
( G(k(t), u(t)), ifk(t) ~
R(k(t),u(t)) = (6)
G(~(u(t)) , u(t)), if k(t) >
Prior assumptions about market demand in (3) are sufficientto insurethat the function R(k(t), u(t))
is concave, nondecreasing, and differentiable in k(t), nondecreasing in u(t) and uniformly bounded
for all realizations of u(t) and all non-negative values ofcapacity k(t) .° The marginal revenue prod-
uct of capital, R, (k(t), u(t)) will, as a consequence of (6), be continuous in each argument and
bounded below by zero.
III. Existence and Uniqueness of Market Equilibrium
The monopolist seeks a contingency rule relating the current value of gross investment, x(t),
to the current values of capacity, k(t), and to the observed demand disturbance, u(t), in order to
maximize the expected discounted value of future net revenue. The maximization is subject to
the constraints imposed by (1)—(6), maintenance of a non-negative level of gross investment, the
optimal sales and production rule q(k(t), u(t)) for each period, and the initial state (k(0), u(0)).
Observe that the nonlinear relation between investment and capacity, (2), may be rewritten as:
x(t) = k(t)m(k(t + 1)/k(t)), (7)
where rn(.) = h~’(.). The function m(.) in (7) is continuously differentiable, increasing and
strictly convex. The two constraints imposed by the adjustment costs in (2) and maintenance
of a non-negative level of gross investment in each period may be rewritten in terms of (7) as
k(t + 1) h(0)k(t).
Defining net revenue in each period by ir(t) = R(k(t), u(t)) — z(t) and denoting expectations
conditioned on information available in period Ib yE~(.),the value function for the monopolist
may be written as:
V(k(0),u(0)) = max>fltEox(t); k(t + 1) e C(k(t)), (8)where the constraint set C is defined through (7) by:
c(k(t)) = {k(t + 1) k(t + 1) h(0)k(t)}. (9)
Maximization of the expected discounted value of net revenue in (8) is achieved by solving the
corresponding functional equation,
V (k(o), u(o)) = max(ir(O) + 13E0V (k(1), u(1))). (10)
Since the constraint set C is strictly convex and nonvoid, the function k(t + 1) — h(0)k(t) is
jointly concave in k(t+ 1) and k(t), and net revenue ir(t) in each period is strictly concave in k(t+ 1),
the sufficiency conditions for dynamic programming established by Blackwell (1965) maybe invoked
to prove the existence, under the most general assumptions regarding the serialdependence of the
random disturbances u(t), of aunique, bounded and continuous solution, V~ (k(o), u(0)), which is
concave in k(0), for the functional equation (10). The right-hand side of (10) will consequently be
attained in every period by a unique and continuous decision rule k(t + 1) = y(k(t), u(t)), which
dictates the optimal level of gross investment for the monopolist through the capacity relation (7).
This establishes the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The unique market equilibrium associated with the initial values ofcapacity and
demand, (k(0), u(0)), is described by:
k(t + 1) = y(k(t),u(t)), (11)
x(t) = k(t)m(y(k(t),u(t))/k(t)), (12)
q(t) = q(k(t),u(t)), (13)
p(t) = D(q(k(t),u(t)),u(t)), (14)
for all realizations of u(t).
The conditions (1 1)—(14) permit a characterization of three properties of optimal monopoly
behavior in this general case. First, as a consequence of the concavity of the revenue function (6),
aminimal positive interest rate, ~(t), will exist at which optimal investment is zero in the current
period.’0 Second, since prior assumptions on market demand in (3) bound the expected marginal
revenue product of capital, E~ 1R1 (k(t),u(t)), above the depreciation parameter S as the level of
capacity approaches zero, alimiting distribution of (k(t), u(t)) will exist in which optimal capacity
k(t) and sales q(t) will be positive in each period with probability onefor all positive interest rates
less than ~(t).” Third, the monopolist’s level of capacity will never exceed that of a competitive
6industry under similar conditions, precisely because the market power of the monopolist, reflected
in the concavity of the revenue function (6), implies that the expected marginal revenue product
of capital is always less than expected market price for any existing level of capacity.’2
A fourth property of monopoly behavior in this general case concerns the influence of irre-
versibility on the nature of the optimal investment decision. When investment is irreversible, the
timing of capital purchases assumes great importance in determining the value of the firm. De-
ferring the opportunity to acquire a unit of capital in the current period can be viewed as being
analogous to holding afinancial call option written on the discounted flow of revenue expected to
accrue to this unit. Making the decision to acquire the unit of capital now is, as a consequence,
much like exercising such an option, and this exercise represents an opportunity cost to the firm
which must be evaluated, along with the direct acquistion cost, against the discounted expected
value of this unit, as implicitly measured by the value function V* (k(0),u(O)).
The optimal timing andmagnitude ofinvestment isreflected in the sequence ofoptimal capacity
levels, {k(s + 1)}~~, selected by the firm. Using the arguments of Benveniste and Scheinkman
(1979) regarding the differentiability of the value function (8), whenever the ratio of capacity in
successive periods exceeds h(0), for any initial stock of productive capacity k(t) extant in period
I, the optimal level of capacity selected in any period I for production in the subsequent period,
k(t + 1), must satisfy the first-order condition:
fiE~V,* (k(t + 1),u(t + 1)) = m’Qc(t + 1)/k(t)), (15)
where /9EzV,~ (k(t+1),u(t+i)) is the discounted expected value of the derivativeofthe valuefunction
with respect to capacity. If x(t) is interpreted as the real cost of gross investment in the current
period, equation (15) indicates that optimal investment equates the direct real cost of acquiring the
marginal unit of capital, m’(.), to I3EtV,*(k(t + 1),u(t + 1)), the discounted expected value ofthat
marginal unit, evaluated along the unique optimal dynamic program of capital accumulation.’3
Now consider defining the functional S(k(t),u(t)) as
E~ (~/3~’(R(k(t), u(t +j)) — k(t)m(1))), (16)
so that S(k(t),u(t)) ~ V*(k(t),u(t)). S(k(t),u(t)) is the value in any period to fthe “constant
capacity” program of capital accumulation, a value which may not exceed, but may coincide with,
the value in that period of the optimal program of capital accumulation, V*(k(t), u(t)). By the
properties of the revenue function G(.), the functional S(.) is everywhere differentiable in its
7arguments and
S, (k(t), u(t)) = ~ (k(t),u(t + j)) - 5)), (17)
where R1(k(t),u(t)) = max(0,G,(k(t),u(t))). S,(k(t),u(t)) is the expected discounted value of the
marginal unit ofcapacity, acquired in period t and evaluated in terms of the stream offuture values
of the marginal revenue product ofthat unit, max(0, C,(k(t), u(t +j)), in each future period I+j.
Equivalently, S,(.) is the expected value ofthe derivative of the value function associated with the
“constant capacity” program, S(.).
The difference between the values of the optimal and the constant capacity programs defines
the functional —J(k(t), u(t)),
—J(k(t), u(t)) = V*(k(t),u(t)) — S(k(t), u(t)) ~ 0, (18)
and when gross investment is positive, _J(.) has a derivative,
—.1,(k(t), u(t)) = V1(k(t), u(t)) — S, (k(t),u(t)). (19)
Along the optimal path, the firmhas the ability or option to acquire capital at any current or future
date I+j. Since — J(.) is the difference between the value of the optimal dynamic program andthe
constant capacity program, the residual —J(.) may be interpreted as the value of preserving the
total sum of options to acquire each possible additional unit of capital at each future date. When
gross investment is positive, the derivative —J,(k(t), u(t)) represents the change in the current
value of that total sum of options, due to the acquisition of the marginal unit of capital when
current capacity is k(t). Consequently, J,(k(t),u(t)) can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of
killing the option to defer the irreversible acquisition of the marginal unit of capital to asubsequent
period. This cost depends on the forms of the revenue and adjustment cost functions and also on
the properties of the transition equation describing the stochastic evolution of consumer demand,
f(u(t),u(t + 1)).’~
Using (17) and (19) in (15), the necessary condition for an interior optimum in any period t
may be expressed as:
fiE~S,(k(t+ 1),u(t + 1)) = m’(ic(t + 1)/k(t)) + /‘3E~J,(k(t + 1),u(t + 1)). (20)
Although it occurs in a general Markovian context, this expression has an interpretation analogous
to the interpretation of optimal investment behavior in the case of geometric Brownian motion
8studied by Pindyck (1988): if capital is to be acquired in the current period, optimal capacity
k(t + 1) is defined by an equality between the expected discounted stream of marginal revenue
accruing to the last unit of capital acquired, /3E~S,(k(t+ 1), u(t + 1)), and the sum of two costs,
which are the direct cost of acquisition, m’(k(t + 1)/k(t)), and the expected opportunity cost
of exercising the option to acquire the marginal unit of capital in the current period, so that it
becomes productive in period t+1, /3E~J1(k(t + 1),u(t + 1)).’~
IV. Equilibrium with Serially Independent Demand Disturbances
Explicit characterization ofoptimal monopoly behavior requires further restrictions to be placed
upon the distribution of disturbances to consumer demand. A case of special interest, examined
also in related contexts by Lucas and Prescott (1971), Reagan (1982), Abel (1983), Amihud and
Mendelson (1983), Schutte (1984), Zabel (1986) andothers, involvesthe examination of astationary
market equilibrium when demand disturbances display serial independence.’6
While market equilibrium still satisfies equations (11)—(20), the assumption of serial indepen-
dence implies that the optimal investment in each period depends only on the current level of
capacity, k(t) ~17 The independence of investment from any realization of the demand disturbance
u(t) in equations (7) and (12), the first-order condition (15) for capacity, the role of unit depre-
ciation costs S as a lower bound on the expected marginal revenue product of capital at a zero
level of capacity, as well as the existence results of Proposition 1 all serve to establish the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. If the distribution of disturbances to consumer demand displays serial indepen-
dence, then for any initial state (k(0),u(0)), there exist unique, non-negative sequences {k(s +
1),x(s),q(s),p(s)} and a positive constant k* which, for k(s + 1) defined by (15) and for s =
0,1,2,..., satisfy:
k~s+1~~ fk(s+1) jfk(s) <k*; 21
‘‘ — 1. k(s)h(0), otherwise,
x(s) = f k(s)m(k(s + 1)/k(s)), if k(s) k*; (22)
1. 0, otherwise,
q(s) = min(~(u(s)),k(s)), (23)
p(s) = max(D(~(u(s)), u(s)), D(k(s), u(s))), (24)
where k* represents the strictly positive, constant optimal level of capacity defined in the unique
stationary equilibrium by:
ER1(k*,u(t)) =S+rm’(l), (25)
9and where gross investment satisfies
x(t) = Sk*, (26)
for all interest rates 0 < r < i~.
If the initial value ofcapacity, k(0), is less than the stationary optimum k~, gross investmentin each
period is selected to yield asequence ofcapital stocks, {k(s+1)}~~, which equatethe direct acqui-
sition cost of the marginal unit of capital purchased in period s, m’(ic(s + 1)/k(s)), to its expected
discounted value, I3EtV,(k(s + 1), u(s + 1)). If the initial value of capacity exceeds the stationary
optimum, gross investment remains zero and capacity erodes at the rate h(0) until convergence
to the stationary optimum occurs•18 When capacity adjustment costs in (2) are strictly convex,
convergence in either case may be oniy asymptotic. This contrasts with the case of aconstant ac-
quisition cost for capital, in which, assuming the valuefunction is bounded, convergence will occur
in one period if the initial value of capacity is less than its st~tionaryoptimum.’9 Production and
price in each period are, by (1) and (3), always at the respective minimum and maximum of their
unconstrained and constrained values. Once the stationary equilibrium is attained, expression (25)
requires the expected marginal revenue product of capital, ER1 (k*, u(t)), to equal the user cost of
capital, which is the sum of the depreciation parameter S and the interest cost term rm’(1).
The description of the constant value of capacity in (25) may be used to characterize the
influence ofcapacity on optimalmonopoly production and pricing behavior. Since existing capacity
is utilized to maximize profits in each period, inspection of equations (23) and (24) reveals that
optimal sales, q~, and price, p~,in the stationary equilibrium satisfy:
I (~(u),D(~(u),u)), for u(t) < u*;
(q* (k* , u(t)),p~ (k~,u(t))) = (27)
L~(k*,D(k~,u)), for if ~
where the threshold value of the demand disturbance, u*, is uniquely defined in the interior of the
support of u(t) through (4) and (7) by the condition ~(u*) = k*. Optimal production and sales,
described in (27), can never exceed the existing level of capacity and excess capacity will appear
for low realizations of consumer demand, as defined by u(t) < if.
Aprimary concern of previous studies of monopoly pricing and inventory behavior by Reagan
(1982), Amnihudand Mendelson (1983), Schutte (1984) and Zabel (1986) is the asymmetry exhibited
by the response ofproduct priceto variations in the random disturbance to consumer demand. Our
model shows that such an asymmetrical price response can also occur in markets with nondurable
goods and depends only on the existence of an upper bound on feasible sales in the current period.
The following proposition is an immediate consequence of equation (27):
10Proposition 3. The optimal product price p~ in a stationary market equilibrium will exhibit an
asymmetrical response, described by:
* k4 if ~ Di(k*,u*). (thi(u)/c9u) +D2(k*,u*), foru(t) < u*; ~(‘ )=~ (28)
u~ D2(k*,u*), for if ~
to those variations in random demand disturbance u(t) which occur in a neighborhood of the
threshold disturbance if.
Marginal revenue for sales will be positive for realizations of the demand disturbance u(t) smaller
than the threshold levelif and, as described in equation (28), the market power of the monopolist
impliesthat it will be profitable to vary both production and price in response to small variations in
consumer demand in this case. Since capacity k* acts as an upper bound on feasible sales, however,
the monopolist will respondto realizations ofu(t) greater thanif only through variations inprice.20
The role of capacity as an upper bound on feasible sales and the role of S as a lower bound on
expected marginal revenuefor low realizations of demand alsoimply that expected sales are always
lessthan the optimal capacity for the monopolist. During any period in the stationary equilibrium,
expected sales for the monopolist are:
Eq*(k*,u) =f ~(u)dF(u) + k* (1— F(u*)), (29)
where F(u) is the cumulative density corresponding to the probability density function 1(u) in the
case where the demand disturbance u(t) displays serial independence. Since optimal capacity k*
exceeds maximal sales ~(u(t)) for all values of u(t) less than the threshold level if, equation (29)
implies that k* > Eq* (k* ,u) in each period. This proves:
Proposition 4. The monopolist maintains a constant positive expected value of excess capac-
ity in a stationary market equilibrium when the disturbances to consumer demand display serial
independence.
Excess capacity, as noted by Meyer (1975) and Nickell (1978) in other contexts, may not be
evidence of productive inefficiency but may instead be an optimal response by a firm to uncertainty.
Maintenance of a positive expected value of excess capacity in the current model simply reflects
the positive probability that the amount of sales maximizing current revenue may be less than
capacity, k*, while the absence of inventoriesrules out the possibility of optimal sales exceeding k*.
The existence of a positive expected value of excess capacity and a random rate of actual capacity
utilization over time for the monopolist is a notable contrast to the competitive industry studied
11by Lucas and Prescott (1971), in which the absence of market power leads firms to produce at full
capacity in each period.
Previous studies by Hartman (1972), Nickell (1977), Abel (1983), Albrecht and Hart (1983)
and others have examined the response of the optimal capacity held by firms to increased uncer-
tainty in demand under a variety of alternative technologies, each involving production constraints
imposed by fixed factor stocks.2’ When efficient resale markets for capital exist, firms using such
technologies may respond to increased uncertainty, as represented by the conditional variance of
demand disturbances or by mean-preserving spreads in the distribution of such disturbances, by
maintaining or increasing their level of capacity, since the acquisition of excess capacity allows such
firms to hedge against the risk imposed by the possibility of unanticipated demand. When capital
investment is irreversible, however, andrandom fluctuations in demand occur in every period, firms
must assessthe benefit of increasing capacity against the opportunity cost of exercising the option
to invest in a future and more favorable state of demand, as discussed by Jones and Ostroy (1984)
and Pindyck (1988).
Our model may be used to examine the effect of increased demand uncertainty on the optimal
stationary level of capacity held by a monopolist employing the production technology in (1) and
facing the convex costs ofcapacity adjustment embodied in (2). Uncertaintyabout future consumer
demand and a one-period lag in the acquisition of productive capital expose the monopolist to risk
from the alternative possibilities of suboptimal levels of excess capacity in situations of insufficient
demand and inadequate capacity in situations of excess demand. The acquisition of additional
capacity in response to increased uncertainty in demand could enhance the ability of the firm to
exploit unanticipated excess demand, as discussed by Jones and Ostroy (1984), but, as noted by
Pindyck (1988), when investment is irreversible, the ability to costlessly alter the rate of capacity
utilization allows the monopolist to only partially hedge against the transitory possibility of in-
sufficient demand, since the cost of exercising the option to acquire an additional unit of capacity
now will be nondecreasing, and may be strictly increasing, in response to the increase in demand
uncertainty.22
When the distribution of disturbances to consumer demand are serially independent, however,
the option value of deferring acquisition of the marginal unit of capacity is zero in a stationary
equilibrium. This may be seen directly from the general first-order condition (20). Recognizingthat
f3E~S,(k(t + 1), u(t + 1)) converges to the discounted value of the difference between the marginal
revenue product of capital and the marginal cost of depreciation, ((E~R, (k* , u) — S)/r) in thiscase,
12the option value of deferring investment in the marginal unit of capacity may, using equation (20),
be written as
EtJ,(k*,u) =~~iEc(R,(k*,u)_ (5+rm’(l))). (30)
By equation (25), however, it may be seen that the right-hand side of (30) is zero after k* is
attained. The opportunity cost of exercising the option to acquire the marginal unit of capacity
is zero in a stationary equilibrium with serially independent disturbances to demand, because the
revelation of the state of demand in any period I contains no information about the evolution of
demand in any future period.23
Since the option value of acquiring the marginal unit ofcapacity is zero, the response ofoptimal
capacity to an increase in demand uncertainty is, by (25), entirely reflected in the convexity of the
expected marginal revenueproduct of capital. The market power displayed in the revenue functions
(4) and (6), may, however, preclude the convexity of the expected marginal revenue product of
capital in the current case. This would attenuate the attractiveness of additional capacity for the
monopolist, unless additional restrictions are placed on the aggregate representation of consumer
preferences in (3). By (6), the marginal revenue product of capital may be written as:
( C, (k(t), u(t)) > 0, for k(t) <
R, (k(t),u(t)) = (31)
L~0, for k(t) ~(u(t)),
for any realization of the disturbance u(t). Inspection of (31) and (25), which defines the station-
ary value of capacity, k*, reveals that a sufficient condition for optimal monopoly capacity to be
nondecreasing in a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of the demand disturbance u(t) is
forthe marginal revenue function, G,(k* ,.), to be convex in the demand disturbance u(t) over the
support of the distribution of u(t).25
Since the convexity or concavity of the expected marginal revenue product of capital depends
directly upon the analogous property of the marginal revenue function C1 (k* , u(t)), further restric-
tions must be imposed on consumer preferences, as exhibited in the inverse demand function (3),
in order to assess the response of optimal monopoly capacity to increased demand uncertainty.26
The following proposition offers a sufficient set of such restrictions:
Proposition 5. The optimal stationary value of monopoly capacity, k*, will be nondecreasing in
a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of disturbances to consumer demand if the inverse
demand function (3) is convex in the demand disturbance u(t) and displays either additive or
multiplicative separability.
Proof of the proposition is straightforward and is left to the reader.
13The creation of additional capacity as a response to greater uncertainty in consumer demand
may be described for the case in which the inverse demand function (3) exhibits convexity in u(t)
and multiplicative separability.27 Equation (31) indicates that increased uncertainty, as measured
by a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of u(t), increases the probability of states of high
demand, in which C, (k* , u(t)) and R, (k* ,u(t)) attain larger values. The ability of the monopolist
to produce at less than full capacity simultaneously implies that R, (k* , u(t)) is zero in states of
low demand, which essentially truncates the lower tail of the distribution of demand disturbances.
Convexity of the marginal revenue product of capital in states of high demand implies that this
asymmetrical response of R1 (k* ,u(t)) to the mean-preserving spread in u(t) acts to increase the
expected marginal revenue product of capital in (31). This increase in the expected marginal
revenue product of capital reflects the market power of the monopolist and creates an incentive for
the monopolist to expand capacity.
V. Concluding Remarks
Uncertainty in consumer demand and irreversibility in capital investment impose a tradeoff
between the relative advantages of enhancing productive capacity through committing to current
investment or maintaining the flexibility to invest in potentially more favorablefuture states. This
tradeoff, in turn, induces an important interdependence in the intertemporal production, pricing
and investment decisions of the firm. Specifically, when capacity constraints in production and the
irreversible nature of capital investment limit the ability of the firm to profitably exploit current
and future random fluctuations in consumer demand, the value of the firm is determined by two
types of decisions about capacity: investment decisions, which affect future capacity, and produc-
tion and pricing decisions, which reflect the utilization of existing capacity. The optimal timing of
investment, determined by the tradeoff between the relative advantages of acommitment to acquire
capital now versus the retention of flexibility to acquire capital later, influences, through the evo-
lution of capacity, the response of price and production by the firm to unanticipated fluctuations
in demand. Our analysis illustrates these essential points by integrating the two types of decisions
about capacity in a simple model of a risk-neutral monopolist serving random consumer demand
for a nondurable good over an infinite horizon.
Unique value-maxin-iizingrules forirreversible capacity investment andthe utilization ofcapac-
ity are first shown to exist for the firm and are described under a general Markovian specification
of demand uncertainty. The optimal timing of investment is reflected by a value of capacity which,
in each period in which gross investment is positive, equates the discounted flow of revenue ex-
‘4pected to accrue to the marginal unit of capacity acquired now to the total cost of that unit. This
total cost includes its direct acquisition cost and also the opportunity cost incurred by the firm in
exercising its option to acquire the marginal unit now instead of retaining flexibility by deferring
its acquisition to a later period. The stationary properties of these rules are then examined when
disturbances to consumer demand display serial independence.
Optimal monopoly behavior in astationary equilibriumwith serially independent disturbances
to consumer demand is described by four propositions. First, the monopolist acquiresthat constant
and positive level of capacity which equates the expected marginal revenue product of capital to
the constant acquisition cost of capital. Second, the response of product price variations in the
disturbance to consumer demand displays an asymmetry due to the role of existing capacity as
an upper bound on sales in each period. Third, this role of existing capacity also insures that
the monopolist will maintain a constant positive expected value of excess capacity in each period.
Finally, since the option value of deferring acquistion of the marginal unit of capital is zero in a
stationary equilibrium with serial independence, increases in demand uncertainty elicit a change
in the optimal level of capacity which ultimately depends directly on the influence of consumer
preferences on the expected marginal revenue product of capital. A sufficient condition for a non-
negative response of capacity to a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of disturbances to
consumer demand is for the inverse market demand function to display convexity in the demand
disturbance and additive or multiplicative separability in its arguments.
While expositional clarity is an important virtue of the model employed here, potential refine-
ments of our analysis, as aconsequence, are numerous and include the consideration ofmore general
production technologies, endogenous delivery lags, the backlogging ofunanticipated excess demand
andthe influence ofimperfect capital markets on the optimal investment profile. Such refinements,
which may be desirable fortheir realism, would leave intact the essence of many of our results while
complicating our analysis in obvious ways. The primary point we wish to emphasize in this paper
is that demand uncertainty and irreversible capital imply significant economic consequences for the
intertemporal behavior of the firm. Our model provides several interesting examples of these.
15FOOTNOTES
1. Studies of irreversibility in the alternative context of a single discrete investment project, the
potential returns to which evolve according to diffusion processes, include MacDonald and
Siegel ((1985), (1986)), Jones and Heaney (1988), and others.
2. The results of our analysis would remain unchanged by the presence of additional productive
factorswhose quantities may be selected after the revelationofthe current state ofdemand. The
essential nature of our results are also independent of the specific fixed-proportions production
technology and adjustment cost specifications in (1) and (2), which are adopted for tractability
and to facilitate comparison with the properties of equilibrium investment in the competitive
industry studied by Lucas and Prescott (1971).
3. The interpretation of capacity adjustment costs in terms of the strict concavity of the function
h(.) relies either on a direct nonlinear relation between physical investment and plant capacity
or on a strictly convex relation between investment costs per unit of capacity and the volume
of physical investment per unit of capacity, which could, for example, occur if the firm has
monopsony power in the market for physical capital or ifthe firm bears an increasing cost of
financing investment due to imperfections in capital markets. The usage ofadjustment costs to
bound the value function V(.) appears, in the context of our model, to be both more realistic
and more tractable than the alternative assumption of exogenous delivery lags appearing in
Nickell (1978) and elsewhere. Although precise specifications may differ, this paper shares a
common assumption of such adjustment costs with Lucas and Prescott (1971), Hartman (1972),
Prescott (1973), Pindyck (1983), Abel (1983), Schutte (1984), Zabel (1986) and others.
4. These assumptions about the inverse demand function are sufficient, but obviously not nec-
essary, to generate those properties of the revenue functions in (4) and (6) required for an
optimum, and may be relaxed where appropriate. Similarly, all our results would be robust
under a relaxation of the assumption that the support of the transition probability function is
bounded, which is adopted only to allow increases in uncertainty to be represented by mean-
preserving spreads, rather than by conditional variance as in Abel (1983) and elsewhere.
5. The assumption that expected marginal revenue from the minimal level of optimal sales, ~
exceeds the marginal cost of maintaining a constant capacity level, EC,(~t),u(t)) 5, is
essentially a condition that there is a non-negligible amount of randomness in demand, and
may be alternatively but more labouriously expressed in terms of restrictions on the transition
16function f(u(t),u(t + 1)). If, for example, the inverse demand function (3) is linear and the
distribution of u(t) is uniform over [~t’ u], this condition is equivalentto assuming asufficiently
largesupport for the distribution: ü — ~> 25.
6. Risk-neutrality is assumed on the part of the monopolist, since, as discussed by Nickell (1977),
it enables the pure effect of uncertainty, through its effect on expected returns to additional
capacity, to be separated from those ancilliary effects created by the increasing riskiness of
those returns. Risk-neutrality may also be justified by assuming the sufficiency conditions of
Malinvaud (1972) regarding spanning are satisfied. The effects of diversifiable and undiversifi-
able risk can easily be taken into account without changing our results, however, by replacing
the riskless rate with the rate of return on a portfolio of assets which is perfectly correlated
with the returns to the capital of the firm, as in Pindyck (1988). Burmeister and McElroy
(1988) present recent empirical evidence on the existence and nature of such a rate.
7. This formulation is intended, as in Lucas and Prescott (1971), Hartman (1972), Reagan (1982),
Pindyck (1983), Abel (1983) and elsewhere, to reflect the observation that pricing andproduc-
tion decisions can be adjusted fairly quickly in response to variations in demand, subject to the
constraint imposed by current capacity, while changes in the level of capacity itself are costly
and occur only with a delay.
8. Lim (1982) examines the optimality of quantity-setting versus price-setting behavior with re-
spect to the convexity of the inverse demand function (3) in the random disturbance u(t).
9. Proof of this andother technical assertions below are available from the authors upon request.
10. Concavity of the revenue function (6) implies that the expected marginal revenue product of
capital will be non-increasing in the value of existing capital and that the optimal capital
stock is ultimately decreasing in the value of the interest rate r. Since optimality will require
that the expected marginal revenue product of capital equal the user cost of capital whenever
gross investment is positive, a time-dependent upper bound, ~(t), will exist on those values
of the parameter r compatible with positive investment. See Brock and Burmeister (1974)
and Burmeister (1981) for an extended discussion of this assumption and its analogous role in
assuring the existence of an interior stationary optimum in deterministic models of investment.
11. A constructive proof, based on analogues to lemmas 9 and 10 in Lucas and Prescott (1971),
can serve to establish the existence in the current model of aunique ergodic set, (/ç, /c) x [st’ u],
in which 0 < /ç < k <oo. Since the marginal revenue product of capital approaches the value
17of D(0,u(t)) for any realization of u(t) as the capital stock approaches zero, the assumption
D(0, u(t)) > 5 is then sufficient to establish that the ergodic set (jc, k) x [ii’ ü} is nonvoid. This
insures that optimal capacity will be positive in each period for all positive interest rates less
than ~(t).
12. See Lucas and Prescott (1971) and Appelbaum and Lim (1982) for adiscussion of the respec-
tive intertemporal and static optimality conditions for a competitive industry under related
conditions. Prescott (1973) discusses the analogous nature of a perfect foresight equilibrium in
adeterministic version of the Lucas-Prescott (1971) model with an oligopolistic industry.
13. The first-order condition (15) may alternatively be expressed as
13E~R,(k(t+ 1),u(t + 1)) — /3[m(k(t + 2)/k(t + 1))
- m’((k(t + 2)/k(t + 1)) • ((k(t + 2)/k(t + 1))]
=rW((k(t+1)/k(t)).
If x(t) is the real cost of gross investment, optimal investment is seen to require the sum of
the expected discounted value of marginal revenue from capital plus the disounted saving in
investment costs from next period, obtained from an additional unit of capital in the current
period, to equal m’(k(t + 1)/k(t)), the marginal current investment cost from acquiring an
additional unit of productive capital for next period.
14. Since the functional J(k(t), u(t)) is interpretable as the total sum ofoptions to acquire new units
of capital in the future, each of which is may be considered an asset with a stochastic return
corresponding to its marginal revenue product in each future period, the reduction of that
future stock of capital through the acquisition of aunit in the current period should, assuming
the usual stochastic domninance conditions are stisfied, result in a decline in the value of the
total sum of options remaining, so that —J, (k(t), u(t)) <0. Our model is, however, sufficiently
general to accomodate any sign for this derivative, where it exists.
15. Apart from its usage of discrete, rather than continuous, time, equation (20) encompasses the
condition for optimal irreversible investment in Pindyck (1988) and extends its interpretation
to the more general class of Markovian environments described here. The optimality condition
in Pindyck (1988), which applies to a model in which demand evolves according to geometric
Brownian motion, is derived by the direct usage of the financial option pricing technique in
Merton (1977), rather than by our more general method of stochastic dynamic programming.
1816. The principal concessions exacted by the assumption of serial independence in the distribution
of demand disturbances are the optimality of a constant level of capacity over time and the
absence of serial correlation in prices, sales, and the rate of capacity utilization. The implica-
tions for monopoly behavior established under this assumption, however, will remain valid for
the antipodal case of serial dependence when they are interpreted as being conditional on the
state of demand realized in the previous period.
17. The assumption of serial independence also allows usage of the unconditional expectations
operator, E(.), anddeletion ofthe explicit datingof future demand disturbances, u(t+s),s> 0,
in the propositions below.
18. Existenceand monotonic convergence to a stationary equilibrium under serialindependence is,
as a consequence, precluded only in the case where both S = 0 and k(0) > k*.
19. If adjustment costs were linear, as for example in Pindyck (1988), so that the direct cost of
acquiring a marginal unit of capital were a positiveconstant c, and ifthe value function were
to remain bounded in this case, which, for example, could occur ifthe conditionally expected
rate of growth in the demand disturbance u(t) were less than the riskless rate of interest, than
the optimal stationary valuefor capacity would be defined by the analogue to (15),
c = I3E0R,(k*,u(1)) + ,9ch(0),
and k, = k* for any initial value of capacity k(0) < k*. Strictly convex adjustment costs rule
out the necessity of one-period convergence. A variational argument may be used to derive a
sufficient condition for next-period convergence to k*, for any k(0) <k*, which is that
mr(k*/k(0) (k(1)/k(0)) •m”(kt/k(0)),
for any ~(1) satisfying k(0) <~(1)<k*.
20. Inspection of equations (21) and (24) reveals that asymmetric price adjustment, analogous
to that described in (28), also applies to random demand fluctuations occuring during the
transition to the stationary equilibrium. Furthermore, owing to the market power reflected
in the revenue function (4), the partial adjustment of prices and production to variations in
u(t) for u(t) < u* contrasts with the perfectly elastic supply exhibited in this range by the
competitive industries studied by Lucas and Prescott (1971) and Reaganand Weitzman (1982).
21. Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983) employ linearly homogeneous production technologies in
which capital is assumed to be fixed in the current period. Albrecht and Hart (1983) employ
19a linearly homogeneous putty-clay technology in which scope for factor substitution exists
through variations in the capital intensity of capacity.
22. Unlike the models of Pindyck (1988), Jones and Heaney (1988), MacDonald and Siegel (1986)
and others, all of which feature constant costs of acquiring capital and demand evolving ac-
cording to geometric Brownian motion over an unbounded support, an implication of the more
general framework of equations (15)-(20) is that increased demanduncertainty may not always
increase the option value of deferring investment by more than the increase in the expected
revenue accruing to a unit of additional capacity. In particular, when the support of the distri-
bution of demand disturbances is compact, so that the firm realizes that the relative demand
for its commodity is bounded and cannot, in any given state of realized demand, become in-
finitely better, the effect of increased uncertainty may instead be state-dependent, with the
net incentive to expand capacity behaving, when disturbances are positively correlated, in a
procyclical manner. Such a situation can realistically be expected, for example, for firm in a
decliningindustry. In the serially independent case, however, the option value of deferring such
investment is zero and invariant to an increase in demand uncertainty.
23. This contrasts to the case of serial dependence, where the current realization of demand condi-
tions the firm’s expectations of future states of demand. Such information is distinct, ofcourse,
from the Bayesian learning effects discussed, forexample, in Cukierman (1979) and Bernanke
(1983).
24. See, for example, the discussions of the role of convexity in Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983).
25. This follows by Jensen’s inequality, as noted in Hartman (1972). It should also be noted from
equation (31) that the marginal revenue product of capital cannot be globally strictly concave
in the disturbance u(t).
26. The necessary and sufficient restriction on the inverse demand function (3) for the marginal
revenue Ci(q, u) to be convex is for q[D, (q; )tu~+ (1— )t)u
2
) — AD1(q, ui) — (1— ~X)D,(q, u2)] ~
[~XD(q,u,)+(1—A)D(q,u2)—D(q,Au,+(1—A)u2)] where u1 and u2 are pointsin the support of
the density of u(t) and 0 < A < 1. Proof that convexity of C, (.) is sufficient for the convexity
of R,(.) in the disturbance u(t) is available from the authors upon request.
27. Using the results in Turnovsky (1976), an example of a set of preferences for a representative
consumer whichwould yield an inversedemand function (3) exhibiting multiplicative separabil-
ity, weak convexity in u(t) and satisfying all prior assumptions about market demand is given
by the indirect utility functionV (p(t),w(t), 1(t)) = ‘y(p(t)) + t~(w(t), 1(1)) where p(t) denotes
20the price of the monopolist’s good, w(t) is a vector of all other prices, 1(t) denotes random
income and where -~(.) is quadratic, and ij(.) is continuously differentiable and increasing in
1(t).
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